Abstract Groundwater is a critical input to agricultural production across the globe. Current groundwater pumping rates frequently exceed recharge, often by a substantial amount, leading to groundwater depletion and potential declines in agricultural profits over time. As a result, many regions reliant on irrigated agriculture have proposed policies to manage groundwater use. Even when gains from aquifer management exist, there is little information about how policies affect individual producers sharing the resource. In this paper, we investigate the variability of groundwater management policy impacts across heterogeneous agricultural producers. To measure these impacts, we develop a hydroeconomic model that captures the important role of well capacity, productivity of water, and weather uncertainty. We use the model to simulate the impacts of groundwater management policies on producers in the High Plains aquifer of eastern Colorado and compare outcomes to a no-policy baseline. The management policies considered include a pumping fee, a quantity restriction, and an irrigated acreage fee. We find that well capacity and soil type affect policy impacts but in ways that can qualitatively differ across policy type. Model results have important implications for the distributional impacts and political acceptability of groundwater management policies.
Introduction
Groundwater accounts for 42% of global water supplies utilized to support irrigated agricultural production (D€ oll et al., 2012) . Much of this groundwater-fed irrigated agriculture utilizes aquifers that are pumped at rates that exceed natural recharge, leading to groundwater depletion over time (Famiglietti et al., 2011; Scanlon et al., 2012) . A changing global climate is predicted to exacerbate aquifer depletion as increased variability in precipitation induces further exploitation of groundwater resources to meet growing agricultural water demands (V€ or€ osmarty et al., 2000) . Aquifer depletion is further encouraged by the common pool nature of groundwater resources (Ostrom et al., 1994) . Addressing aquifer depletion and the market failure associated with common pool resource use requires groundwater management policies that balance the short-run economic costs of reduced water use with the benefits of long-run water availability.
Despite growing interest in aquifer management (Little, 2009) , the distribution of the costs and benefits of groundwater management policies across space and time remains unclear. In this paper, we investigate how spatial and temporal variation in both aquifer characteristics and agricultural production conditions determine the impact of specific groundwater management policies using a spatially explicit hydroeconomic modeling framework. The model is applied to the Colorado portion of the Republican River Basin and incorporates agricultural producer planting and groundwater use decisions as economic choices that account for spatial variation in hydrologic, agronomic, and climatic conditions. Hydroeconomic models are the primary tool utilized to evaluate the costs and benefits of groundwater management policy alternatives (Harou et al., 2009) . Recent literature recognizes the importance of modeling spatially explicit aquifer responses to pumping (Blanco-Guti errez et al., 2013; Esteve et al., 2015; Guilfoos et al., 2013 Guilfoos et al., , 2016 Mulligan et al., 2014) while accounting for human behavioral responses to changing aquifer conditions. These models do not, however, account for heterogeneity in both aquifer and agricultural production conditions across groundwater users and time. In particular, previous literature does not capture the important role of falling well capacity over time. Most existing economic models of groundwater use assume that the primary avenue connecting changes in hydrology and groundwater use decisions is the vertical distance required to pump groundwater at the well's location in the aquifer. In this formulation, the costs of groundwater depletion are limited to the additional energy costs required to pump groundwater an increased vertical distance. Recent literature, however, argues that well capacity has a larger impact on groundwater use decisions than depth to groundwater (Foster et al., 2015) .
Well capacity, i.e., the allowable yield of a well (''well yield''), represents a physical constraint imposed by local hydrologic conditions. Declines in well capacity limit an irrigator's ability to meet daily crop water requirements and have been shown empirically to diminish the productivity of groundwater (Colaizzi et al., 2009; Foster et al., 2014; Lamm et al., 2007; O'Brien et al., 2001; Peterson & Ding, 2005) , leading to nonlinear changes in irrigated land and producer profits (Foster et al., 2015) .
This paper is the first that we know of to implement a basin-wide hydroeconomic model that incorporates economic behavior that is driven by changes in well capacity and changes in depth to groundwater. The paper contributes to the groundwater management literature in three important ways. First, we develop a novel methodology for deriving changes in well capacity using output from a spatially explicit groundwater model calibrated and tested for the Republican River Basin (Republican River Compact Administration [RRCA], 2007) . This allows us to account for the dynamic feedbacks that exist between aquifer and economic systems. Second, we develop a methodology for estimating well-specific and crop-specific production functions at the basin-wide scale to account for heterogeneity in demand for groundwater across irrigators and time. Third, we utilize a two-stage economic decision-making model to account for weather uncertainty in planting and water use decisions. This rigorous decision framework captures the role of planting decisions in driving the demand for water while highlighting the weather risk faced by producers as groundwater becomes depleted.
Our analysis of groundwater management policies focuses on three types of regulations: a pumping fee, a quantity restriction, and an irrigated acreage fee. The focus on these three policies is driven by feedback that we received from stakeholders in the study area and the fact that each policy type is being implemented to manage groundwater in other locations within Colorado and neighboring states. Following previous research (Guilfoos et al., 2016) , the analysis evaluates policies with a structure that is viable and implementable, rather than attempting to identify economically optimal policy instruments. Additionally, the rationale for evaluating the impacts of management policies stems from stakeholder objectives to increase the long-term sustainability of their shared groundwater resource. Model results demonstrate the heterogeneity in policy impacts across space. This heterogeneity is explored with an econometric model of well-level differences in the impact of policies on the net present value of profits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A background and literature section introduces the study area and situates this research within the groundwater economics literature. The methodology of the hydroeconomic model development is described in section 3, emphasizing how differing model components are utilized and integrated into the modeling framework. We then present and analyze the results generated by the hydroeconomic model regarding how alternative management policies influence heterogeneous groundwater users. Finally, results are discussed in section 5 and we conclude in section 6 with a description of the implications for future hydroeconomic modeling and groundwater management policies in practice. See supporting information, which includes data sets 1-8, for a description and access to the data generated by the hydroeconomic model and analyzed in the paper.
Background and Literature Review
The High Plains aquifer is the largest aquifer in North America, underlying over 450,000 km 2 from northern Texas to eastern Colorado and north to South Dakota. Large-scale, groundwater-fed irrigated agriculture supported by the High Plains aquifer began during the 1930s (Robson & Banta, 2005) . Developments in pumping and irrigation technology and the availability of low-cost energy allowed further expansion of irrigated agriculture in the post-war era, transforming the High Plains from the ''Great American Desert'' to the ''breadbasket of the world'' (Sanderson & Frey, 2014 location of the Basin in the High Plains aquifer). The Basin comprises 18,000 km 2 , nearly the area of the state of New Jersey, and has only 57 active surface water rights which supply less than 4% of water utilized for irrigation (Colorado Division of Natural Resources, 1996 , 2017b Maupin et al., 2014) . The scarcity of surface water in the Basin highlights the importance of groundwater to the local agricultural economy.
Given the importance of groundwater for the rural economy (Thorvaldson & Pritchett, 2006) , there is growing concern among producers and community members in the Basin regarding the depletion of the shared groundwater resource. At the same time, there exists considerable heterogeneity in saturated thickness and well capacity across groundwater users in the study area. Figure 2 describes the distribution of well capacity across the 3,006 permitted, active groundwater wells in the Basin, illustrating the variation in access to groundwater that exists.
An extensive body of literature uses hydroeconomic models to examine how hydrologic and economic systems interact and to evaluate the costs and benefits of groundwater management policies. Gisser and Sanchez's (1980;  henceforth ''G&S'') notable conclusion that gains to groundwater management are negligible served as a starting point for an active debate within the literature regarding the merits and efficient design of groundwater management policies. Research building on G&S relaxes many of the restrictive assumptions employed in their original work to test the robustness of their findings. Allen and Gisser (1984) demonstrate that the G&S result does not depend on the specification of the water demand function. Similarly, Feinerman and Knapp (1983) show that, although model parameters influence gains to management, the benefits remain relatively small. Brill and Burness 10.1002 10. /2017WR020927 (1994 show that the best potential for gains associated with management occur in cases where the discount rate is low, well capacity decreases with aquifer depth, and water demand grows over time. However, in their formulation changes in well capacity only affect pumping costs, not the productivity of water, and are assumed to be uniform across space. This early literature utilized representative producers and singlecell, ''bath-tub'' aquifer models which assume that the aquifer responds uniformly and instantaneously to groundwater pumping.
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Research by Brozović et al. (2010) questions the applicability of single-cell models in accurately capturing the spatial externality of groundwater pumping. Using results from the physically based Theis (1935) solution that simulates changes in groundwater head in surrounding areas due to pumping, Brozović et al. (2010) suggest that for large aquifers, single-cell models may significantly underestimate pumping externalities compared to spatially explicit models. In response, more recent research utilizes spatially explicit hydrologic models (Esteve et al., 2015; Guilfoos et al., 2013 Guilfoos et al., , 2016 Mulligan et al., 2014) . These studies highlight the importance of aquifer heterogeneity in understanding groundwater use decisions and the impacts of management policies. Finally, the breadth of hydroeconomic literature demonstrates the importance of incorporating models of economic decision making when evaluating how the behavior of resource users interacts with a dynamic physical system and a changing policy landscape.
To account for the spatially explicit nature of groundwater availability, hydroeconomic models have utilized a suite of groundwater flow simulation models. The basis for the majority of these models is Darcy's Law, a momentum equation that describes water flow through a porous medium based on head gradient and hydraulic conductivity (Klute, 1965) . Whereas some studies have used Darcy's Law by itself to model water flows from location to location within an aquifer due to pumping (Guilfoos et al., 2013 (Guilfoos et al., , 2016 , others use physically based spatially distributed groundwater models that imbed Darcy's Law into a conservation of mass statement to account for head fluctuation in a multidimensional, heterogeneous unconfined aquifer system. For example, several hydroeconomic models (Kahil et al., 2016; Mulligan et al., 2014; No€ el & Cai, 2017) utilize regionally calibrated versions of MODFLOW (Harbaugh et al., 2000) . In particular, Kahil et al. (2016) and Mulligan et al. (2014) utilize the same RRCA MODFLOW model as employed in our analysis (RRCA, 2007) , while Kuwayama and Brozović (2013) employ calibration data from the RRCA model in their analysis. These hydroeconomic models account for the spatial heterogeneity of groundwater availability over time, but, by themselves, do not fully account for the complex variation in groundwater demand across space.
One important component of groundwater demand that has recently received attention in hydroeconomic modeling is well capacity (Foster et al., 2014 (Foster et al., , 2015 Peterson & Ding, 2005) . Foster et al. (2014) demonstrate that groundwater depletion-induced decreases in well capacity can generate large reductions in irrigated acreage, as an irrigator anticipates constrained intraseasonal groundwater availability. To demonstrate the connection between well capacity and water use in the study area, Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between average water use and both well capacity and depth to groundwater using reported annual groundwater use data for our study area over the period 2011-2015.
The r 2 statistics reported in Figure 3 demonstrate that depth to groundwater does not explain the observed variation in groundwater pumping decisions, which stands in contrast to the more significant positive relationship between well capacity and pumping decisions. These empirical results, combined with the connection between groundwater depletion and diminished well capacities (Hecox et al., 2002; Konikow & Kendy, 2005) , highlight the importance of including well capacity as a dynamic feedback linking economic and hydrologic systems consistent with Foster et al. (2015) .
Previous literature utilizes groundwater demand functions that are independent of crop choice, soil type, growing season weather realizations, the amount of land irrigated, and well capacity (Blanco-Guti errez et al., 2013; Brill & Burness, 1994; Gisser & Sanchez, 1980; Mulligan et al., 2014) . These hydrologic and agronomic attributes, however, are important factors in determining groundwater demand as water needs and crop yields differ across crop and soil types (Hanks, 1983) , realized weather outcomes (Blaney & Criddle, 1962) , well capacity, and total irrigated acreage (Foster et al., 2014) . Guilfoos et al. (2016) recognize this shortcoming and evaluate how heterogeneous groundwater demand influences irrigator welfare gains under specific aquifer management scenarios. Nevertheless, heterogeneity in groundwater demand and crop choice are assumed constant across time. In contrast, our model allows for variable groundwater demand across both space and time.
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Annual planting decisions are an important determinant of well-level groundwater demand as irrigation requirements differ across crops (Hanks, 1983; Pfeiffer & Lin, 2014) and diminished well capacity can induce irrigators to decrease irrigated acreage (Foster et al., 2014) . Previous literature models planting choices by utilizing long-run groundwater demand functions that implicitly account for changes in production, technology, and crop choice (Guilfoos et al., 2016) . However, this approach does not fully capture the dynamic interaction that occurs between evolving aquifer conditions and irrigators' yearly planting decisions. Mulligan et al. (2014) model crop choice-specific groundwater demand as a function of changing pumping costs and fixed crop yield estimates. But their methodology does not account for the uncertainty regarding growing season weather outcomes that irrigators experience when making planting decisions prior to these outcomes being realized. Our irrigation decision-making framework surmounts this challenge by explicitly modeling planting decisions made under growing season weather uncertainty, similar to Sunantara and Ram ırez (1997) . Our method allows irrigators to respond to evolving aquifer conditions by adjusting along both intensive (water applied per acre) and extensive (number and type of irrigated acres planted) margins.
Methods
In this section, we describe the three primary components of our hydroeconomic modeling framework. We begin with a description of the economic model that determines planting decisions and groundwater use. Next, we describe the process by which the production functions used in the economic model are generated using the agronomic model, AquaCrop (Steduto et al., 2009) . We then describe the groundwater model and how it allows groundwater use decisions to interact with aquifer characteristics, followed by a discussion of how the three model components are dynamically integrated and a demonstration of baseline model output. We conclude the section with a discussion of the three specific policies that we evaluate using the hydroeconomic model.
Economic Model
The economic model assumes that a two-stage decision-making process determines annual groundwater use decisions, with an individual, independent well, indexed by i51; 2; 3; . . . ; I, serving as the decisionmaking unit (Manning et al., 2017; Sunantara & Ram ırez,1997) . We assume that well operator decision making is myopic and does not consider externalities imposed on neighboring wells in present or future time periods. Given this, the pumping decisions in the baseline, no policy, scenario do not maximize the value Figure 3 . Plots of the relationship between reported groundwater pumping and (left) well capacity and (right) depth to groundwater in the Republican River Basin of Colorado. Well capacity data were obtained from results of recent well capacity tests mandated by the Republican River Compact Agreement. Well-level depth to groundwater data were obtained from a USGS geospatial data set (Flynn et al., 2009) . Reported groundwater pumping data come from the Colorado Decision Support System. The r 2 statistics reported come from two separate linear regression models relating the mean groundwater pumping to the well capacity or depth to groundwater. Note: 1 gal./min. is equal to 0.06 L/sec, 1 ac. ft. to 1,233.48 m3, and 1 ft. to 0.3048 mm.
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obtained from the groundwater resource. In the first stage, planting decisions that maximize expected profit are made based on a known distribution of potential weather outcomes, or weather risk. In the second stage, a particular weather outcome is realized and the producer is assumed to make a profitmaximizing irrigation decision, conditional on the crop mix chosen in stage one.
In the first stage, the number of acres planted in crop j; with j51; 2; 3; . . . ; J; is determined for each well before weather is realized for the growing season. Each well is assumed to have the ability to irrigate a parcel of irrigated land with A acres. The first-stage objective function is
where f j is the per-acre water-yield production function for crop j, which depends on the amount of water applied per acre, x ij . c it is well capacity and is a function of hydrologic characteristics of the aquifer at well location i in year t, q it . h it is a random variable representing weather for well i in year t, and / i includes well-specific soil characteristics. Importantly, @f @c ! 0 and
@c@x ! 0, which implies that reductions in capacity result in lower yield of crop j. Finally, crop yields per acre depend on the number of acres planted in each crop, A ij , which captures the fact that when fewer acres are irrigated, more water can be delivered per acre of irrigated land. The per-acre cost of planting and harvesting crop j is given by h j . The cost of pumping a unit of groundwater for well i, l d it ð Þ, is a function of the depth to groundwater, d it at well i in time t. It is assumed that @l @d > 0, which reflects higher energy costs as depth to groundwater increases. A is a constraint on the maximum amount of land an irrigator can plant with irrigated or dryland crops. Groundwater management policy parameters are included in the formulation of the economic model to generalize the model to an evolving policy landscape. Specifically, s is a fee levied per unit of groundwater pumped, W is a constraint that limits the total volume of groundwater a well can pump within a season, and x is a fee paid per acre of irrigated land.
At the time of planting, the weather outcome, h it , is a random variable. In stage two, h it is realized and an irrigation decision for each irrigated crop planted is made such that
In the second stage, A ij represents the planting decision made in stage one, which is fixed in stage two, and the producer chooses the volume of water to apply per acre of each crop, x ij to maximize profit. The model is parameterized and solved using backward recursion, which generates profit-maximizing irrigation decisions at each well for all possible weather realizations. Substituting profit-maximizing irrigation decisions for all weather realizations into equation (1) provides the information needed to solve for the stageone planting decision that maximizes expected profits. This calculation is made at each well, generating profit-maximizing planting and irrigation decisions specific to weather and a well's capacity, soil type, and depth to groundwater. It is important to note that our formulation of well-level profit per-acre measures returns to all fixed factors of production (i.e., land, water, capital, and management). In other words, the profit per acre generated by the model should not be thought of exclusively as land rent. In order to calculate irrigated land rent per acre, fixed expenses (e.g., machinery repairs) and returns to capital and management must be subtracted from the well-level profits.
We utilize crop enterprise budgets to estimate the costs of planting and harvesting crop j, h j (Crop Enterprise Budgets, 2013). The model includes irrigated corn, dryland corn, irrigated wheat, and dryland wheat, which represent more than 90% of total acreage planted in the Basin (USDA NASS, 2017). The function l d it ð Þ is parameterized such that the average well's volumetric pumping cost equals the pumping costs reported in enterprise budgets for northeastern Colorado (Crop Enterprise Budgets, 2013) . Also, it is assumed that l 0 ð Þ50. Crop enterprise budget are utilized to estimate the cost structure of the well
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operator's expected profit maximization problem. The cost parameters reported in enterprise budgets represent average input use and management strategy decisions for the study area. This modeling approach does not capture heterogeneity in the per-acre costs of planting and harvesting that may exist if well operators utilize above or below average rates of input use, though we find that qualitative results do not vary substantially as cost parameters change. Additionally, price and cost assumptions were validated through interactions with producers across the Basin. In those instances when producers had concerns regarding the values of particular parameters, sensitivity analyses were conducted to assess the robustness of the results to alternative values.
We utilize a USGS data set to obtain initial well-level depth to groundwater (Flynn et al., 2009) . Mean initial depth to groundwater is 151.39 ft (46.14 m) with a standard deviation of 52.66. The model utilizes 15 years of USDA data on national, marketing year crop prices to estimate average output prices which we assume are constant across the simulation period (USDA NASS, 2017). Finally, the output price of a given crop does not depend on whether it is irrigated or not. Table 1 summarizes the price and cost parameters used for the well-level hydroeconomic model.
Agronomic Model
The well-specific water-yield production functions, f j x ij ; c it q it ð Þ; h it ; / i ; A ij À Á , used in the economic model are parameterized using output from AquaCrop (Steduto et al., 2009 ). The water-driven plant growth model simulates crop biomass accumulation at a daily time step taking soil, weather, agronomic, hydrologic, and management parameters as inputs. See Steduto et al. (2009) for a complete review of the agronomic principles underlying AquaCrop. We utilize an updated, open-source version of AquaCrop developed by Foster et al. (2017) that permits the model to accept well capacity and the amount of land irrigated as inputs to constrain irrigation scheduling and the productivity of water.
To generate water-yield production functions that capture the breadth of agricultural production conditions in the Basin while maintaining model tractability, we classify each well by climatic zone, soil type, and well capacity. For each unique combination of climate, soil type, and well capacity, water-yield production functions are generated for corn and winter wheat across three complete growing season weather realizations that represent normal, wet, and dry conditions. The climate inputs to the agronomic model used to generate the water-yield production functions for corn and winter wheat include daily temperature, reference evapotranspiration, and precipitation data. For these inputs, we use data from two weather stations with complete data records collected by the Colorado Agricultural Meteorological Network (Colorado Climate Center, 2016). The geographical locations of these two stations capture the north-south temperature and precipitation gradients of the Basin and are used to divide the Basin into Northern and Southern climatic zones. The zones have similar average growing season precipitation and temperature but differ in the timing and frequency of weather events for a given year. Table 2 presents the percent of total wells located in each climatic zone. To account for the variation in weather realizations, three specific years, 2003, 2004, and 2005 , are selected to represent dry, normal, and wet growing season weather conditions respectively. The specific years are assumed to occur with probability 0.2, 0.6, and 0.2, respectively.
The years chosen for the base model specification are meant to capture the range of weather conditions experienced by producers as well as the hydrologic conditions captured in the hydrologic model. Given the importance of recharge in driving changes in groundwater stocks and the relationship between weather and recharge, our determination of normal, wet, and dry, years is based upon the distribution of recharge volumes specified in the RRCA MODFLOW model (RRCA, 2007) . Data availability within the publicly available version of the RRCA model limits our analysis of recharge volumes to the 1997-2005 time ). When mapping this determination of normal, wet, and dry years to annual climatic zone precipitation amounts, we find that annual precipitation for 2004 (North, 13.84 in, 35, 15 cm; South, 14 .70 in 37.55 cm) is qualitatively similar to average annual precipitation across the 1997-2005 time period for both climatic zones (North, 13.58 in, 34.39 cm; South, 12.90 in, 32.76 cm) . 2005 and 2003 have annual precipitation amounts greater than and less than the average, respectively, for both climatic zones. Therefore, the distribution of weather considered by producers when making planting decisions places the highest probability on normal weather but considers the possibility of wet or dry years decreasing or increasing the volume of water needed to achieve a given crop yield.
The soil characteristics at each well are classified using tabular data from the NRCS SSURGO database (Soil Survey Staff, 2015) . In measuring well-specific soil characteristics, it is assumed that each well lies at the centroid of the area that is irrigated. The SSURGO data set provides soil parameters, which serve as inputs for AquaCrop. The land surrounding each well is placed into one of two categories that correspond to the dominant mineral components (clay/silt or sand) present in the soil. Table 2 presents the percent of wells within each soil classification.
The well capacity of each well is classified into one of forty-four 25-gallon-per-minute (gal./min) bins, ranging from less than 25 gal./min (1.58 L/s) to more than 1,075 gal./min (67.82 L/s). This level of discretization was intended to capture the breadth of physical conditions facing producers over time, while keeping the dimensions of the model tractable. Initial well capacity data were obtained from well-level tests required by the Republican River Basin Compact Agreement, conducted between 2009 and 2015, and compiled by the Colorado Division of Water Resources (Colorado Division of Water Resources, 2017a). All groundwater wells are assumed to irrigate using a center pivot irrigation system, which is the irrigation method that accounts for more than 85% of all irrigated land in Colorado (USDA, 2013). Furthermore, we assume wells can potentially irrigate up to 130 ac (52.61 ha). This is the modal area irrigated in the study area and corresponds to a full circle of irrigated land on a quarter-quarter section of land (Bauder et al., 2004) . Planting decisions for specific crops are discretized into quarter circle (32.5 ac, 13.15 ha) increments. The quarter circle increment was chosen as the minimum management unit based on feedback from producers in the study region who noted that it was not practical from the standpoint of irrigation and crop management to plant less than 32.5 ac (13.15 ha) of a particular crop.
An irrigation management schedule specifies the frequency and amount of irrigation applied throughout the growing season and is determined by a soil moisture target (SMT) that establishes a percentage of the soil's available water capacity (AWC) between the permanent wilting point and field capacity. If the AWC falls below the SMT on a given day, then an irrigation event is triggered in AquaCrop to increase the AWC back to that season's target. However, an irrigation event's capability to meet a deficit between current AWC and the SMT is constrained by well capacity and the number of acres irrigated. We follow Foster et al. (2014) in assuming that irrigation events occur only during the growing season, producers do not schedule irrigation events in anticipation of future AWC deficits and the SMT remains constant throughout the growing season. These simplifying assumptions presume potentially inefficient irrigation behavior as other irrigation scheduling strategies, such as variable SMTs, may increase the productivity of water. We vary the SMT in 10% increments from 0% to 100% for a given combination of crop, soil type, well capacity, weather realization, amount of irrigated land, and climatic zone to relate crop yields to seasonal water application rates for all potential combinations of weather, well characteristics, and land types. This produces a yield and water volume for each crop model run.
Piecewise functions are generated to fit the crop yield and water application data generated by AquaCrop for each well type. We assume that yield response to irrigation is constant below the minimum yield and above the maximum yield predicted. In between the bounds defined by minimum and maximum yield, a second-order polynomial is fit to the remaining yield and irrigation application data utilizing a least squares algorithm. This data-generating and function-fitting process is repeated for all possible combinations of crops (2), climatic zones (2), well capacities (44), soil types (2), weather realizations (3), and irrigated acreage Water Resources Research 10.1002/2017WR020927 decisions (4) to create 4,224 unique water-yield production functions that capture the heterogeneity in agricultural production conditions observed in the Basin. The appropriate production functions are then assigned to each specific well in the Basin by matching on observable characteristics. As an illustration, Figure 4 presents estimated production functions for two different well capacities across two acreage decisions, demonstrating how the productivity of water for low-capacity users differs based on the amount of land irrigated. Note that when the full 130 ac (52.61 ha) circle is irrigated with low well capacity, water productivity is very low compared to higher capacity. On the other hand, if only a quarter of a circle is planted (32.5 ac, 13.15 ha), the low-capacity and high-capacity wells perform similarly in terms of crop yield per acre for a given quantity of water applied.
Well Capacity and Producer Outcomes
Using the agronomic production functions to parameterize f j x ij ; c it q it ð Þ; h it ; / i ; A ij À Á , we can explore the role of well capacity in influencing optimal planting decisions and expected profit. Figure 5 provides an example of how well capacity influences optimal expected profit on sandy (Figure 5a ) and silt/clay (Figure 5b ) soil, Figure 4 . Example of water-yield production functions for corn planted on sandy soil in the northern climatic zone during a normal weather growing season for wells with capacity of 300 and 1,000 gal./min. Note: 1 acre is equal to 0.405 ha, 1 gal./min. to 0.06 L/s, 1 bu./ac. to 0.063 MT/ha, and 1 in to 2.54 cm. holding the depth to water constant at 150 ft. (45.72 m). Differences in planting decisions are the primary source of large changes in expected profit as well capacity varies. The strong relationship between well capacity and profitability suggests that holding capacity constant over time fails to capture a key linkage between saturated thickness, water use, and profitability. Comparing Figures 5a and 5b demonstrates how heterogeneity in soil conditions also plays an important role in determining profitability. All else equal, crops planted on sandy soils require more irrigation water to achieve a given yield. This leads to lower expected profit on sandy soils for wells with low capacity.
Hydrologic Model
The economic model is linked to hydrologic conditions through changes in well-level pumping capacities and depth to groundwater. The Republican River Compact Agreement (RRCA) MODFLOW hydrologic model (RRCA, 2007) simulates spatially variable hydraulic head for the 1918-2005 time period on monthly stress periods, with two time steps for each stress period. The horizontal discretization of the model is 1 mi by 1 mi (2.59 km2), with one layer representing the entire thickness of the aquifer. The model incorporates groundwater pumping, evapotranspiration, recharge from rainfall, groundwater and surface water irrigation, and canal and stream seepage. Recharge is derived from both precipitation events and groundwater and surface water irrigation events, with 17% of recharge assumed to come from irrigation return flows. This recharge parameter was based on that used in the original RRCA calibrated MODFLOW model. The model was calibrated and tested using observed groundwater levels throughout the Basin (RRCA, 2007) . Simulated cell-by-cell water table elevation for the year 2000, estimated 2009 saturated thickness for the Colorado portion of the Basin, and pumping capacity (gal./min) for each irrigation well are shown in Figure 6 .
For this study, the MODFLOW model is used to account for the impacts of agricultural decisions (i.e., crop selection and associated groundwater pumping volume) on well capacity, which is dependent on the maximum allowable pumping rate (Q allow ) for a given location. Methodology for determining Q allow is now described and will be referenced in section 3.5. Q allow is dependent on the available drawdown s allow (vertical distance in the aquifer between the current groundwater level and the level of the pump), and therefore a relationship must be established between pumping rate, Q and drawdown, s. This is accomplished for a single well with the following steps:
1. Tally monthly model pumping rates Q and the corresponding monthly simulated drawdown s for the 1918-2005 simulation period. s is computed by subtracting the monthly simulated head value at the well h well from the head value at the beginning of the year, with h well estimated using the cell-average head value h cell computed by MODFLOW and the Dupuit-Thiem equation (Thiem, 1906) :
where r w (ft) is the effective radius of the well borehole, r dist (ft) is the distance from the edge of the cell to the pumping well, and K is the horizontal aquifer hydraulic conductivity (ft 2 /d). In this study, r w is set to 1 ft. (0.3048 m) for each well, and K is provided by the value specified for each MODFLOW cell. Equation (3) assumes steady, symmetric radial flow of groundwater toward a pumping well, and neglects any head loss due to local turbulence around the well.
2. Plot the Q-s relationship from (1) and compute the inverse slope; this is most easily done using the maximum values of Q and s. The inverse slope is the ratio of Q to s (Ratio Q-s ). 3. Ratio Q-s can be used to determine maximum allowable pumping rate (Q allow ) for a given allowable drawdown (s allow ) at any point during a scenario simulation:
Ratio Q-s , although analogous to specific capacity in that it relates Q to s, neglects the well losses, and thus only provides a measure of groundwater levels in the aquifer. There may in fact be additional head loss within the immediate vicinity of the well borehole that lowers head in the well below the pump, but this study does not provide results at such detail.
For this study, the pump is assumed to be 10 ft. (3.048 m) above the aquifer bottom. Calculations also account for the occurrence of multiple pumps within a single MODFLOW grid cell, with Ratio Q-s divided by the number of pumps residing within the cell, based on the historical pumping rate assigned to each well. Figure 7 provides results for two pumping wells in the study region, with Ratio Q-s values of 11,412 and 13,892 ft 2 /d (1,060,21 and 1,290.61 m 2 /d), respectively. This method assumes that the Q-s relationship derived for each pumping well is valid for all future scenarios simulated.
The well-specific maximum allowable pumping estimates (Q allow ) relate aquifer drawdown predicted by the RRCA model to pumping capacities. However, Q allow does not capture other well-level heterogeneity in pump characteristics and efficiency which also determine well pumping capacity. To address this omission, we utilize a data set of recent well capacity tests conducted in our study area to calibrate initial pumping capacity. Yearly percent changes in a well's Q allow are then used to scale the reported initial pumping capacity. This method allows our model to account for heterogeneity in well pump efficiency when predicting changes in well capacity through time.
To validate our methodology in predicting changes in well capacity through time we compare our modeled changes in well capacity with We compare this result with the average yearly change in well capacity across the 50 year simulation period for the baseline, no policy, scenario. Our modeled average yearly decrease in well capacity is 4.38 gal./min (0.277 L/s), which is numerically similar to the observed annual decrease in well capacity. This validation provides additional evidence that our model accurately portrays how well capacity diminishes over time in response to aquifer depletion.
Dynamic Model Integration
In this section, we describe how the hydroeconomic framework integrates the economic and hydrologic models to capture dynamic system feedbacks. The sequence of operations in the integrated model begins with the economic model predicting planting and groundwater use decisions in year one (t 5 1) for each of the 3,006 wells in the model. Initial well capacities are used to connect individual wells to the appropriate well capacity-specific production functions. Predicted groundwater pumping is then aggregated to the MODFLOW grid cell and serves as the input into the year one (t 5 1) iteration of the hydrologic model. Yearly grid cell pumping volumes are assumed to be uniformly distributed throughout the growing season (May-August) and are utilized to rewrite monthly pumping volumes specified in the MODFLOW WELL package input file.
MODFLOW output from year one provides input for the next iteration of the economic model (t 5 2), updating well-level depth to groundwater and scaling initial well capacity based on changes in Q allow , as predicted by the hydrologic model. We discretize well-level depth to groundwater measurements into forty 10 ft (3.048 m) bins between 10 and 400 ft (3.048 and 121.92 m). This iterative process is repeated throughout the simulation period, dynamically linking well-level groundwater pumping decisions in year t to aquifer conditions in year t 1 1. See Figure 8 for a flow chart describing the sequence of operations defining the hydroeconomic model integration. The calculation of Q allow for each well is dependent on each well's estimated specific capacity (SC), i.e., the ratio between pumping rate Q (ft 3 /d) and resulting drawdown (ft). Q allow for each well is calculated using the available drawdown s allow and the well's Ratio Q-s value (see equation (4)). The use of Ratio Q-s assumes a linear relationship between Q and s no matter the pumping rate, which is valid since well losses are not included in the head and drawdown calculations (see section 3.4). Note that equation (3) implies a nonlinearity between Q and s, however, this nonlinearity is relatively minor when s is small in comparison to total saturated thickness.
Growing season weather realizations are also an important determinant of groundwater pumping decisions predicted by the economic model and aquifer recharge specified in the hydrologic model. We specify a 5 year weather cycle based on the assumed frequency of normal, dry, and wet growing seasons and repeat that cycle throughout the model simulation period (normal, wet, normal, dry, and normal). From the producers' perspective, each year has the same weather distribution as of the time of planting.
We also assume that each well's pumping and irrigation technology is fixed throughout the simulation period. There is a possibility that groundwater depletion or management may induce groundwater users to drill deeper wells or invest in more efficient groundwater pumps or irrigation infrastructure. While these dynamic adjustments via capital investment have the potential to alleviate the pejorative effects of groundwater depletion and management, they are outside the scope of this analysis.
To illustrate integrated model output, Figure 9 presents baseline (no policy) groundwater use (Figure 9a ), profit (Figure 9b ), irrigated (Figure 9d ) with fixed well capacities over time (lighter curve) and with well capacities that vary using the methods described in this section (darker curve).
Based on the model output depicted in Figure 9 , holding well capacity constant over time results in much smaller decreases in Basin-wide groundwater use and profit than when well capacity changes over time.
Over the simulation period, as water productivity falls due to declines in well capacity, Basin-wide water use also falls even with no water management policy in place. These results suggest that models that do not account for well capacity lead to predictions that overstate water use over time and underestimate the impact of groundwater depletion on producer profits.
Planting decisions are a key determinant of the relationship between aquifer conditions and agricultural profits as diminished well capacity constrains a producer's ability to fully irrigate water intensive crops. Baseline model results provided in Figure 9 for Basin-wide total irrigated acres and irrigated corn acres highlight how evolving aquifer conditions alter cropping patterns across time, shifting irrigated land away from water intensive crops (i.e., corn). Again, not accounting for the impact of well capacity leads to model output that underestimates the effects of groundwater depletion on cropping patterns and the amount of land irrigated. Decreases in the number of irrigated acres can have important economywide implications, as impacts from the agricultural sector are transmitted into the broader rural economy (Thorvaldson & Pritchett, 2006) . Baseline model output demonstrates the importance of well capacity changes in predicting profits, groundwater use, and land use. Therefore, in presenting results, we focus on policy impacts as predicted by the model with variable well capacity, though we compare results to estimated policy impacts when well capacity is fixed over time.
Policy Scenarios
The assumed myopia and failure to internalize external costs in well operator decision making constitutes a market failure in the baseline scenario. We utilize our hydroeconomic framework to simulate the implementation of groundwater management policies, which are motivated in-part by this market failure. The policies that we evaluate using the hydroeconomic model include a pumping fee per acre-foot of water, a quantity restriction on the annual volume of water used, and a fee per irrigated acre planted. Note that the quantity restriction establishes an institutional limit on pumping at a given well. This differs from the allowable pumping rate described in section 3.4 that establishes a physical limit on the volume of groundwater that can be pumped. We focus on these three specific policies for two reasons. First, through interactions with producers in the study area, we determined the types of policies that could potentially garner support among producers. A second motivation for analyzing these specific policies is that each one is currently being implemented to manage groundwater in Colorado or in a neighboring state. For example, a pumping fee is in place for groundwater users in Colorado's San Luis Valley (Smith et al., 2017) , and quantity restrictions are in place in a number of Nebraska's Natural Resources Districts (Nebraska Natural Resources Department, 2016). A small fee of $14.50 per irrigated acre ($35.82 per irrigated ha) is currently levied on all groundwater users in the Basin to pay for measures to meet Republican River Compact compliance requirements (Republican River Water Conservation, 2017).
The magnitude of the three policies that we evaluate is chosen such that they independently achieve a 10% reduction in initial expected groundwater use from the baseline, ''no policy'' scenario. The 10% reduction objective was again chosen based on feedback from stakeholders in the study area. Producers voiced an interest in evaluating policies that would generate substantive reductions in groundwater use, but would not be seen as overly restrictive to producers in the region. Although our focus in this manuscript is on policies that achieve a 10% reduction in groundwater use, the relative policy impacts across space and time are consistent across a wide range of reduction targets.
The policy levels that achieve the 10% reduction goal are a pumping fee of $78/ac ft (s 5 $78/ac ft, $0.0632/m3), a quantity restriction of 240 ac ft per well (W 5 240 ac ft, 296,035 m 3 ), and an irrigated acreage fee of $185/ac (x 5 $185/ ac, $457.14/ ha ). Revenues generated from the two fee-based policies are assumed to be aggregated by local management districts and redistributed ex-post via lump sum transfers to irrigators and are included in profit. Importantly, this redistribution approach does not reduce the behavioral impact of the fee. The large number of users in each district implies that the amount of fees that any one individual pays does not have a significant impact on the fees that are rebated back to them. In all cases, we assume a 5% discount rate to calculate the net present value (NPV) of profit under base and policy scenarios. The NPV of agricultural profits represents a discounted sum of agricultural profits that captures how the opportunity cost of money influences the value of future profits. Finally, we assume a 50 year time horizon when calculating NPV under the baseline and all policy scenarios.
Results
We now present the results of groundwater management impacts using the dynamic hydroeconomic model. We first present the Basin-wide average policy impacts by comparing the NPV under each policy scenario to the baseline, no-policy, NPV. To explore the importance of dynamic well capacity in the model, we then examine how the predicted impacts change when well capacity is held constant at initial levels. Next, we examine how policy impacts are distributed across space in the Basin. Finally, we utilize an econometric model to characterize how hydrologic and agronomic conditions determine well-level policy benefits and the spatial distribution of policy impacts.
Basin-Wide Policy Impacts
In this section, we discuss the Basin-wide average impacts of each of the three policies. Table 3a presents the average benefit per well of each policy, both in levels (Column 1) and as a percent of baseline NPV (Column 2). Note that policy impacts refer to how groundwater management affects well-operator returns to fixed factors, as described in section 3.1, compared to the baseline, no policy, scenario. In all cases, the Water Resources Research
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water management policies lead to lower NPV than in the absence of policy. The quantity restriction is the most costly on average but also results in the biggest increase in saturated thickness after 50 years (Column 3). Higher saturated thickness also means that year-50 well capacities are highest under the quantity restriction. The quantity restriction is expensive because it mostly affects wells with relatively high capacity that would otherwise pump more than the restriction. Therefore, the quantity restriction induces conservation among a relatively small set of wells rather than distributing conservation across a larger set of wells. This concentration of conservation efforts on wells with high initial water use leads to larger profit losses as the costs of conservation are distributed across fewer wells
Despite having the smallest impact on producer profits, a pumping fee results in the second-largest increase in saturated thickness and well capacity. The pumping fee is more cost effective because it provides all wells with an incentive to conserve water while remaining flexible in how water reductions occur. When faced with a pumping fee, producers can choose a combination of strategies. For example, they can change the proportion of acres planted to differing irrigated crops, fallow acreage, and/or reduce the volume of water applied on a given acre. By comparison, the acreage fee provides an incentive to reduce only along the extensive margin, specifically by changing the proportion of irrigated versus dryland acres, and/ or fallowing acreage, resulting in a higher cost for a given quantity of water conservation. Table 3a shows that no policy produces a benefit for a majority of producers in the Basin (Column 5). However, Table 4 demonstrates that the pumping fee does generate benefits for the majority of low-capacity irrigators (Column 4), demonstrating the fee's effectiveness in preserving water productivity while minimizing profit impacts. The relatively large standard deviations of average policy benefits indicate the degree of heterogeneity in policy impacts across groundwater users, which we further explore in section 4.2. Also, a Note. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. See section 3.6 for more information on the specific levels of management policies evaluated. 1 ft. is equal to 0.3048 m and1 gal./min to 0.06 L/s. Note. Low-capacity wells are those wells whose initial capacity is less than 500 gal./min (31.55 L/s) while high-capacity wells' initial capacity exceeds 500 gal./ min (31.55 L/s). Low-profit wells are those wells whose initial expected profit in the baseline scenario is less than the median value while high-profit wells' initial expected profit exceeds the median value. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses next to the average change in NPV.
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larger share of low-capacity wells benefit from the quantity restriction compared to high-capacity wells (Column 5), demonstrating how the quantity restriction may not further constrain wells whose low capacity is already constraining their pumping to levels below the restriction. Specifically, the quantity restriction only constrains 7.4% of wells with a capacity below 500 gal./min while it affects 90.3% of wells with well capacity above 500 gal./min. When examining the impact on wells with higher than the median baseline expected, year-one profits, 97.3% are affected by the policy. For wells with baseline expected, year-one profits below the median, the policy only binds for 40.1% of wells. This suggests that higher capacity and higher profit wells bear the majority of the cost as well as provide the majority of water conservation in the Basin under a quantity restriction. These results have important implications for local support of management policies and how the spatial distribution of well capacity might influence that support.
To further explore the distributional impacts of management policy implementation, we examine the average change in the NPV of profit for high-capacity and low-capacity wells and high and low-profit wells. Table 4 demonstrates that the average impact of policy implementation varies significantly based on a well's initial pumping capacity and profitability. The qualitative relationship between policy impacts remains the same whether evaluating differences between low-capacity and high-capacity wells or low-profit and high-profit wells, which follows intuition given the relationship between well capacity and profitability (see Figure 5 ). Low-capacity and low-profit wells experience smaller average changes in the NPV of profits compared to high-capacity and high-profit wells given the implementation of the quantity restriction and pumping fee policy. Note the significant difference in the average impact of the quantity restriction policy between high-capacity and low-capacity and profit wells. Higher capacity and profit wells bear the majority of the costs of groundwater conservation under a uniform quantity restriction, providing further evidence that the constraints imposed by low well capacity render the quantity restriction nonbinding for many lowcapacity and low-profit wells. With the irrigated acreage fee, the costs of groundwater conservation shift to low-capacity and low-profit wells, as the low productivity of irrigation water pumped from these wells leads to lower net returns per irrigated acre and induces costly responses along the extensive margin. Finally, note that the difference in profit impacts between the different well types is significantly smaller for the pumping fee than either the quantity restriction or the irrigated acreage fee. This supports the notion that the cost of the pumping fee is spread more widely while also minimizing the total profit losses associated with groundwater management (see Table 3a ).
Finally, to illustrate the importance of accounting for changing well capacities in understanding the impacts of groundwater management, Table 3b presents Basin-wide policy impacts when the same policies are implemented as described in section 3.6, holding initial well capacity fixed across the simulation period (rather than dynamically responding to updated groundwater availability). The results illustrate the importance of accounting for changing well capacities in understanding the impacts of groundwater management. The average policy benefits reported in Table 3b differ in both magnitude and relative ranking from those reported in Table 3a , particularly for the quantity restriction and irrigated acreage fee policies. In fact, the quantity restriction appears to be a more costly policy when ignoring well capacity changes over time. This result follows intuition given that variable well capacity acts to further constrain pumping through time even in the baseline scenario. This diminishes the impacts of both the pumping fee and quantity restriction.
The opposite is the case for the irrigated acreage fee. When well capacity is fixed the cost of implementing the policy decreases compared to the variable well capacity results. Policy costs diminish for the irrigated acreage fee because policy response is determined by the relationship between the net return of an irrigated acre planted and the policy level. When well capacity is fixed, the net return of an irrigated acre remains relatively stable as diminished pumping capacity does not decrease the productivity of water. This stability in groundwater availability allows irrigators to continue planting irrigated acreage and minimizes the impact of the policy. The irrigated acreage fee in the fixed well capacity scenario therefore has the smallest impact on producer profits among the policies analyzed given the scenario of fixed well capacity. However, the irrigated acreage fee also results in the smallest amount of preserved saturated thickness and benefits the smallest percentage of well operators. The constraints imposed by diminishing well capacity alter irrigation behavior and the relative costliness of groundwater management policies. As such, the remaining policy analysis focuses on evaluating policy impacts given variable well capacity.
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The Spatially Explicit Impacts of Management Policies
We now examine the distribution of policy impacts across the Basin. Figure 10 provides a well-level comparison of NPV in the simulation period from the baseline scenario relative to the NPV under the three policy scenarios. Black triangles represent wells whose NPV increases due to policy implementation compared to the baseline, while white triangles represent wells whose NPV decreases due to policy implementation. The spatially explicit results illustrate the concentration of policy impacts in certain areas of the Basin. Note that the quantity restriction primarily generates gains for users in parts of the Basin with relatively lower initial well capacity and saturated thickness (see Figure 6 ). This spatial clustering of policy benefits can have important implications for policy implementation in practice.
The distribution of wells that benefit from the pumping fee is more uniform across space. This occurs because all wells face an incentive to reduce water use and they can adjust along the most cost-effective margins, making the policy more likely to produce net benefits. The irrigated acreage fee, on the other hand, only incentivizes extensive margin adjustments and is costly to most wells in the Basin.
Explaining Heterogeneous Policy Impacts
Finally, we evaluate the drivers of heterogeneity in policy impacts across the Basin. To do this, we estimate the following descriptive statistical model using ordinary least squares:
NPV p i is the change in net present value of well i's profit for policy p compared to the net present value of profits in the no-policy baseline. As in the theoretical model, d i0 and c i0 ; are initial depth to water and well capacity, respectively. s i is the number of wells within 2 mi of well i, HC i is the hydraulic conductivity of the aquifer at well i. / i is the soil type of well i and c r is a fixed effect for the local groundwater management district (GWMD) r: We include GWMD fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity that potentially exists between GWMDs. Hydraulic conductivity (HC) describes the ease with which water moves through a porous medium and HC measures for the study area were obtained from a US Geologic Survey data source (Cederstrand & Becker, 1998) . Specifically, HC is a dummy variable for hydraulic conductivity greater than 20 ft/d. We utilize a different, more recent data set to generate the HC variable than what is used in equation (3) as we believe these data better capture spatial heterogeneity across wells. The well density and hydraulic conductivity variables are included to account for the magnitude of external impacts between wells. Wells that are closer together and have higher conductivity generate higher external costs of groundwater use and we therefore predict that they will benefit more from groundwater management. The b values are intercept and slope coefficients and i is a mean-zero, random error term. Note that this statistical analysis seeks to describe the association between policy impacts and the explanatory variables specified, rather than establish casual inference or extrapolate beyond the sample (Shmueli, 2010) .
The estimation results presented in Table 5 illustrate how the relative NPV under the pumping fee, quantity restriction, and acreage fee varies across wells in the Basin. Several important lessons emerge from these results. First, for the three policies evaluated, a sandy soil type is associated with smaller well-level management policy benefits, supporting the intuition that reducing water use on sandy soils has a higher cost.
Next, we examine the role of well capacity in influencing policy impacts. For the pumping fee, quantity restriction, and irrigated acreage fee a higher initial well capacity is negatively associated with the policies' profit impact as wells with higher capacity pump more groundwater and plant more irrigated acres in the baseline scenario and experience profit losses due to the implementation of management policies. This means that wells with higher capacity reduce water use by more than those with low capacity, leading to higher initial costs. In fact, many low-capacity wells use less water than the quantity restriction even with no policy in place, meaning they experience no policy cost while still receiving some benefits from neighboring wells conserving water over time.
Initial depth to water does not have a significant impact on policy benefits of the pumping fee, quantity restriction, or irrigated acreage fee. This lack of a statistically significant relationship provides further support for the notion that the additional pumping costs associated with increased depth to groundwater play a minimal role in determining producer decision making (see Figure 3) as well as the impact of management policies.
Finally, wells that are located closer together tend to benefit more from the pumping fee and quantity restriction. However, this relationship is not statistically significant for the irrigated acreage fee which follows intuition as the irrigated acreage fee does not directly target groundwater use and less effectively addresses the external costs imposed by neighbors pumping. Further, when well density is interacted with a dummy variable for high hydraulic conductivity (HC), it leads to even greater benefits associated with the implementation of the pumping fee and quantity restriction. This follows because high well density and higher levels of HC increase the external impacts of neighbors' pumping which therefore increases the benefits associated with groundwater management.
Discussion
The hydroeconomic model results illustrate how the costs and benefits of different groundwater management policies depend on interactions between aquifer and agricultural production conditions. In particular, while sandy soils consistently decrease management policy benefits, other factors, such as well capacity, have differing impacts across the policy types. Importantly, our modeling methodology captures the linkage between aquifer dynamics and producer decision making by simulating changes in well capacity over time. Note. Significance levels are indicated by ***1%, **5%, and *10%. Standard errors are reported next to coefficient estimates in parentheses. Econometrics results are generated using GWMD fixed effects. The number of observations is truncated from the total set of wells included in the hydroeconomic model due to missing hydraulic conductivity data.
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Accounting for time-varying well capacity is important to understanding water use and agricultural profitability under both baseline and policy scenarios.
Model results describing the distribution of policy impacts across space present a powerful tool to aid in targeting regions for groundwater management and formulating policies tailored to heterogeneous aquifer and agricultural production conditions. For example, a greater proportion of groundwater users in the southern part of the Basin benefit from the quantity restriction policy than users in the northern parts of the Basin. This relative difference in policy impacts derives from heterogeneous aquifer and agricultural production conditions. Many groundwater users in the southern part of the Basin have low initial well capacity, rendering the quantity restriction policy nonbinding. However, these users still benefit as the quantity restriction limits the pumping of less capacity-constrained neighbors whose pumping imposes an external cost. By comparison, in the northern portion of the Basin, the quantity restriction generates sparse benefits as the relative abundance of groundwater and sandy soil conditions induce high levels of baseline pumping, making the quantity-based policy binding for more wells. Decreased water use has a high cost because of the minimal storage capacity of sandy soils. This example provides insight into how our model results can provide policymakers with valuable information about who will be impacted by different policy types. By simulating the implementation of differing policy types and magnitudes, and evaluating how policy impacts vary across wells, policymakers can identify suitable management strategies that meet policy objectives in a cost effective and equitable way. Policies can then be designed to minimize losses and to distribute policy impacts in a desirable manner across groundwater users.
Overall, the pumping fee generates positive benefits for more groundwater users than the quantity restriction or irrigated acreage fee, which follows the economic intuition that a fee-based policy equates the marginal product of water to its marginal cost. Of course, the relative cost effectiveness of the pumping fee is not guaranteed because equating the marginal benefit of water across wells may not be optimal if marginal external pumping costs vary widely across the Basin. Despite the merits of the fee-based policy, it does not generate benefits for a majority of groundwater users which would likely make policy implementation challenging. The pumping fee does create benefits for a higher proportion of groundwater users than the quantity restriction or irrigated acreage fee. Furthermore, this result is robust when partitioning low-capacity and high-capacity users, demonstrating the efficacy of the fee in mitigating the external costs of groundwater use across heterogeneous users. Future research should relax the assumption of a uniform pumping fee and explore how the design of fee-based policies and fee redistribution mechanisms that capture differences in marginal external pumping costs enhance policy efficiency.
We also demonstrate that failing to account for varying well capacity produces incorrect predictions about water use over time. Without appropriately accounting for well capacity, estimated management impacts do not consider the key linkage between aquifer dynamics and agricultural outcomes. Models built without the inclusion of well capacity as a dynamic feedback may have limited policy relevance, particularly for distributional impacts, as they ignore an important factor that determines the magnitude of management benefits and costs. While our modeling framework assumes fixed irrigation and pumping technology, capital investment decisions may be an important adjustment irrigators utilize to dynamically respond to management policies and aquifer depletion. Future research should relax this assumption to understand the mechanisms that determine investment in irrigation and pumping technology.
This research also presents a novel application of a two-stage economic decision-making framework within a hydroeconomic model. This two-stage economic model captures how uncertainty regarding growing season weather affects groundwater use and planting decisions and how that relationship evolves as groundwater resources become further depleted. Future research should build upon our simplistic representation of growing season weather heterogeneity to understand how producer decision making interacts with a more realistic depiction of regional climate dynamics. In particular, this future research should focus on the impact of increased drought frequency due to climate change in determining producer decision making and the benefits of groundwater management.
Finally, this paper does not purport that the policies evaluated constitute least cost or optimal policies. Given the complex nature of aquifer resources and heterogeneity in external costs across wells, the optimal policy is well-specific and dynamically changing through time. The implementation of a policy of this sort would likely impose high administrative and enforcement costs. The challenge then becomes choosing Water Resources Research 10.1002/2017WR020927 which policy to adopt. Currently, the irrigators in the Basin most likely to be negatively impacted if no management policy is implemented are those whose initial well capacity is the lowest. The quantity restriction represents the least cost policy for these irrigators who are already constrained by their diminished capacity to pump groundwater. At the same time, the quantity restriction represents the most costly policy for highcapacity irrigators. This tension motivates future research efforts that relax some of our assumptions about policy uniformity over space, time, and well characteristics to investigate how the spatial scale of policy implementation influences policy impacts, the potential support for differing policies, and the distribution of policy impacts across groundwater users.
Conclusion
This paper develops a novel hydroeconomic modeling framework that contributes to the understanding of how aquifers and groundwater-fed irrigated agricultural systems interact through time and space. It is the first instance in the literature that includes well-level capacity dynamics in a basin-scale integrated hydroeconomic model. This modeling framework captures well-level heterogeneity in aquifer and agricultural production conditions, allowing variation in geophysical attributes across wells and time to drive groundwater demand and the impacts of management policies. We also address the temporal disparity and uncertainty of planting and groundwater pumping decisions with a two-stage modeling framework that captures the complex, nonlinear relationship between groundwater depletion and profit-maximizing groundwater use.
Our results highlight how aquifer and agricultural production conditions interact to determine the impact of management policies. We find that uniform conservation policies impose costs on average but impacts are heterogeneous across producers and policy types. A more accurate understanding of linkages between economic decisions and policy types informs stakeholders and policymakers in the creation and implementation of effective policy instruments. We also provide evidence that omitting the role of well capacity can lead to misleading conclusions about the magnitude and distribution of groundwater use and policy impacts over time. Our results suggest that existing and future hydroeconomic models of groundwater systems can be greatly improved by accounting for the important dynamic feedbacks attributable to diminishing well capacities caused by groundwater depletion.
